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An evaluation of the working efficiency of Naval organi-
zations in comparison with the efficiency of non-military orgcuii-
zationo illustrates some interesting points of likeness and
difference* One of the most prominent features of the commercial
world is the emphasis on aeu.no of improving competitive effective-
ness* In industry, bettor means for accomplishing objectives are
continual) <? ly sought* The dynamic interest of profit-motivated
organizations in improved efficiency appears to be matched, by the
military, with on attitude of moderate but increasing interest*
One of the means of securing improvement involves analysis
of operations vith a view toward eliminating! Combining* rearrang-
ing or simplifying them* This process is usually called work
simplification* Here advanced techniques for improving efficiency
are known as operational* or systems* analysis* These practices
are widely followed by commercial organizations, and to a certain
extent by the Naval Shore Establishment* A medost work simplifi-
cation program has only recently been adopted as a tool for use
by operating commanders, and systems analysis is as yet an art
not praoticed by the fleet*
One of the reasons that efficiency seems to be de-emphasized
by the military la that decisions regarding personnel allowances
and manning levels are a resultant of the manpower requirements
of the Operating Forces (which are in turn based on estimates and
experience-judgments, the "maintenance and operation factor" } on.
the one hand and manpower availability figures on the other*
These decisions are made in a context which recognizes a tradi-
tional approach to peacetime manning levels, an approach which
recognizes that fighting ability is roduced in peacetime due to
manpower limitations, but that mobilization in event of war will
bring the fleet up te its war compliment*

The concept of the H short var** and the continuation of
"eomi-poace** oeto the background for a comparison of ai lit -ry
and commercial attitudes en efficiency*
Fel leving the outbreak of a major war, neither civil nor
military organisation* can logically expect to nake substantial
additions to their organisational structures. A doctrine of
mobilization build-Hip to a var footing is ruled obsolete by the
short var concept* Following the outbreak of a hot var, each
organization oust operate as best it can for as long as it can*
without reorganization} reinforcement or resupply* "General
mobilization** vill not be possible if war-warning is en the
order of minutes* Further, after the first few hours, the mo-
bilization base ef the economy, if not actually destroyed* vill
be so disrupted as to prevent systematic support ef the operating
forces*
Undor the philosophy of the short war, var readiness and
peace readiness cannot be tve different things* As this philoso-
phy applies to manpower, peaoetime manning levels are wartime
manning levels*
The distribution of manpower in Navy tactical organiza-
tions is also a factor vhich limits tho number and effectiveness
of units available for assignment to cold var or semi-peace dutios*
Assuming that a type—commander has a certain number of men avail-
able for assignment to his units, and the units require a specific
number of mon, the number ef units available to the type-commander
is limited by (among other things) his ability to man them* For
this reason, it is a matter of military necessity that ve assure
ourselves
i
(a) that personnel allowances are realistic in assigning the
correot numbers and qualifications of personnel te permit
the unit te fulfill its objectives, and
(b) that this assignment ef manpower is based en determination
ef the proper number of men te do the necessary verk in the
correct manner*,

The United States Huvy gives considerable attention to
Item (a), the problem of allowances* Unit allowances are under
continuous scrutiny and arc frequently revised, particularly in
regard to provisions for changes in the rating structure. But
in regard to I ton (b), one observes an interesting anomaly* In
comparison with civil organisations! the operating forces of the
Nary appear to giro a minimum of organized attention to develop-
ing the best methods of doing the necessary work* Little urgency
has been attached to the proposal that wo improve our traditional
work methods. "Allowances less x per cent" is the scale with
which vo have manned our organizations for yoars* As far as can
be deterained 9 no systematic study of the methods by which our
organizations can best fulfill their commitments,, with a minimum
usage of manpower* has ever been made*
One result of this failure to analyze our objectives i».*d
working techniques has been a lethargy in adopting modern work-*
ing methods* Another is the continuous "layering effect," as
administrative requirements, laws, policies, directives and
orders are translated and implemented, and implant themselves
into our working habits* In comparison with commercial organi-
zations operating similar work systems, there is reason to
quostion whether our input of manpower and effort gives us our
money's worth of product*
The suspicion that our traditional work methods are not
particularly efficient is shared by an authoritative and highly
critical segment of .uaerican society* Charges of "Pentagon
Waste," no matter how debatable, carry considerable force when
presented in an outspoken manner by competent observers of the
competitive scene* As the shortage of peacetie appropriations
continues, Congress or other financially-interested bodies may
be expected to become increasingly hostile to any habits that
may exist oa the part of the military of accepting leas—than—
logieal processes in the use of its material and manpower*

The purpose of thio paper 1st
1* To ex nine the possibilities of an organized approach
to work simplification by the operating forces, una to
consider sono of the problems likely to be encountered
in introducing syatoaatio work simplification*
£• To suggest that while work simplification as it is now
practiced by industry and the Naval shore establishment
eon be very useful as a tool toward increasing working
efficioucy, there is a second approach which offers even
bo re promise* This jLs the "systems** concept*

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OP WORK SIMPLIPICATION
la 1032 Allan II • Mogenson vroto a book culled Common Sonse
Applied to notion and Tlcio Study in which he proposed a new
approach toward oconony and efficiency in industry* Ilia aew plan
was called "work simplification** Work simplification omphasized
the ability of overy worker and supervisor to make valid observa-
tion of operations and to devise ways of improving those operations*
This method required* mainly* that the observer be Capable of basio
systematic analysis of the operations which he observed* The
advantages of work simplification were obvious* It offered an
ideal way for the rank-and-file to participate in the improvement
of operations* Not only did this make good economic sense, but
it offered psychological satisfaction as well* It capitalized on
the traditional .meric-n urge to find a better way to do things*
And while a reasonable amount of training in the nature of work
analysis was to be preferred* Logonoon' s method had the advantage
of requiring considerably less investment in training* and analysis
effort than did time and motion study or similar industrial engineer-
ing methods*
Speaking in September* 1059, Mr* Mogenson defined work
simplification as "the organized application of coexson sense to
the process of doing work*" Inferior quality* high cost produc-
tion, slow development and poor production rates he ascribed to
the lack of work simplification methods* Mr* Mogonsoa advooated
2-
the following programs
By Professor Erwin R* Scholl of Massachusetts Institute
of Technology*
2
"Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Standards
Engineering Society, " The Magazine of Standards, XX (November,
1950), p* 327* This article describes a speech by Mr* Mogenson
at the eighth annual meeting of the Standards Engineering Society*

1* Develop and tea oh a philosophy of work oimpli float! on by
study, instruction and by inviting all employees to
parti oi pato in tho program*
2. Investigate all operations to secure a factual basis for
analysis*
3* .Analyze operations, challenging each detail*
4* Select or develop a preferred method.
0* Institute the preferred method, caking certain that it is
applied correctly*
0a the wbolo, the idea of vork simplification has boom well
accepted by the industrial and commercial world, although its
proponents would say that the response has bees less thorough
than the adv ntugoa of the system deserve* As a measure of its
success, a decade after the formulation of the idea—by the mid—
die of tho 3ocond World War—supervisors trained in tho nation-
wide Training Within Industry Program voro given a briof course
in work si. plifi cation techniques* Following the war* acceptance
of work simplification continued to grow and it is today a normal
feature of good management in large organizations* Formal programs
for the development, recognition and adoption of improved work
mothods are commonplace* Business literature continuously pub—
4licizes improved work methods* In a typical Industrial organi-
zation which practices work simplification today, a supervisor is
likely to be able to construct a flow chart, has an awareness of
motion economy principles, is well informed on the high cost of
L« T* Alford and H* Russell Bcatty, Principles of Industrial
M^nugecient (New Yorki The Ronald press, 1001), p. 492* For addi-
ticnal information on Training tfithin Industry Program see also
William Ii* Newman, Administrative ..ction (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1055), p* 86$ Bale Yodor, Personnel Management and Industrial
Relations (New Yorkt Prentice-Ball, Inc., 1951), p* 255 J and
Franklin E« Folto, Introduction to Industrial Management (Now Yorki
UcGrav-Bill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p« 108*"""
4
See various recent issues of Factory
;
Management Methods, ' ' •
Supervisory^ Management, Systems and Procedures, Office Management*
Management Review* *





Over the /ears there have grown up three basic variations
in the meaning of the tern "work simplification*" The iaterprota-
tions change doponding on the scalar level of tho organization
which is involved in the work simplification program, as fellovst
1. Worker-orionted work simplification programs*
Hogenson's "organized application of common sense" is an
ofton-used phrase that seems to be direoted toward less experienced
parti ci panto, toward workors who may have a minor degree of train-
ing in motion economy, layout, or the like, and toward supervisors
who perhaps have hud some additional training and who encourage &
"teamwork" approach to "working smarter, not harder." A typical
worker-oriented work simplification program involves a system for
bringing forth valuable suggestions and a team-off ©rt atmosphere*
"The predominate emphasis /la present day/ work ai.uplifi cation
programs lies in the direction of .group participation," says one
observer* "There seems to be little doubt that 'getting people
into the act* dees more to produce positive results than does any
other technique* • • Psychologically, people are not likoly to
impede positive results of an idea which they have had a part in
v
deve loping* Out even more important, they will help sell an active
interest on tho part of their fellow workers* * * /.vork sicaplifi ca-
tion/is the organized application of common sense to the solution
of business problems* Knowledge shared by many employees is
brought to focus on a single problem or a group of related problems*
to the end that all necessary work is accomplished in a highly
L. L* Livegood, "Work Simplification at DuPont," Supervisory
Management , IV (July, 1959), pp* 2, et noqq *
Milton ilolzhaousor, "The .Vork Simplification Concept,"
Workshop for Mana^cnont , The tie port of the Kighth /uantu.l juectlng ' -
of the £>ystops and procedures .sso elation (hereinafter referred to
as Workshop for ^aa^cmont) (Greenwich* Connecticut! The Management
Publishing Company, 1956 ) , p. 213*

8efficient manner*" Another authority points out that "vork
einplifi cation iff like a course in first aid. It teaches the
average person to know how to handle minor ills and trhat to do
until the doctor cones* It docnn*t enable the layuna to pcrfora
7
nnjor surgery or diagnose baffling illnesses*"
£• Engineer—centered concept of work nictplifi cation*
For an industrial engineer, vork simplification is a term
broadly describing the b nic purposo of his profession* The
field encompasses time and notion study, vork process analysis,
work measurement and the like* Methods and tine study engineers,
aocording to Alford and Deatty, are the real practitioners of
vork simplification* Under the "enginecr-contcrod concept," the
parti ci pation of the supervisor and worker, while perhaps helpful,
io an item of niacellany* Although a "really ciaart 'staff expert 1
will secure a high order of group participation as a part of his
•staff experting* • • • the biggest single advantage in the staff
expert approach lies in tho facility to accomplish savings rather
promptly, and in tho saving of line personnel time which otherwise
Q
night be diverted*"
3* Supervisor-oriented work simplification program*
/in emerging view of work simplification combines the other
v
two systems, but euphasizes the role of the lower line authorities*
Under this system, each supervisor has a considerable degree of
awareness of modern work simplification nothode* He can and dees
use the simpler techniques of industrial engineers, such as flow '
process analysis, work count, work distribution, space layout,
?
David Gindoff , "Getting the Moat out of Manual Methods
and Devices," Workshop for Management (Greenwich, Connecticut!
The Manageraent Publishing Company, i960), p* 170*
8
Alford and Deatty, op , cit ,, pp* 470-402; lialpii M* Barnes,
Motion and Time Study (New X»rk» John Wiley and Sons, 1058), p* 536*
e
Milton Uolzhaeuser, op* cit *, p* 214*

work sampling and motion economy* Ue probably doos not uoo noro
advanced techniques, ouch as ti. c study* lie cooperates with a
"work simplification coordinator" vh© nay be an industrial en-
gineer assigned to the encouragement of the work sinplifi cation
progran* Ho trains his subordinates in tho noro basic concepts
and encourages then to use initiative in dove loping iuprovod
methods*
The supervisor—oriented program is most suitable to situa-
tions vhereins
(a) Thore is a shortage of industrial engineers,
i
(b) Either the vork force is sufficiently stable as to be able
to absorb considerable training in such natters, or suffi-
ciently unstable as to prevent significant training, and
(o) The supervisory ranks are filled vita highly competent
professional supervisors*
The supervisor—oriented vork simplification program is
especially adaptable to organizations possessing the characteristics
of Naval units* The Navy-sponsored program for training senior
petty officers and Junior officers in vork simplification is
supervisor-oriented*
The Navy has recognized work simplification as a valuable
means of improving efficiency* Work simplification programs are
in effect in substantially all Bureau-controlled activities* Navy
instituted vork sinplifi cation programs *-re entirely comparable to
industrial vork simplification programs, beings (a) administered
by industrial engineers, (b) backed by positive supervisory
aotivity, and (c) vorker participation oriented* These Bureau-
sponsored programs have unquestionably contributed to increased
efficiency and economy in Navy projects involving industrial-
type vork, just as many industrial vork simplification programs
have led to remarkable increases of output and reduction of costs*
Unfortunately, the success of the shore establishment in
putting vork simplification to vork has not been accompanied by
equal success on the part of the operating forces* Surprisingly,

10
no nyotr-a.tic vork siuplifi cation program h.«s over been ..doptod by
the operating forces, Improved procedures of various types are
undoubtedly established in the operating forces through the desire
of individuals or of individual units to is prove thoir efficiency*
Nevertheless, failure of the fleet to adopt a program comparable
to those used by the Bureaus or similar to those widely used in
industry is a puzzling situation* Whereas the fleet nukes every
effort to adapt to tho changing work patterns brought about by
the introduction of the moat advanced technical equipment, tho
operating forces are veil behind the shore establishment in the
10fiold of i. proving vork methods* Through its neglect of this
matter, one muy conclude that the fleet is expending a good deal
of effort and material that probably would not be expended by a
civil onterpriso committed to meeting similar objectives in a
competitive atmosphere*
Fortunately, the first stages of the solution of this
problem seem to bo developing* The Chief of Naval Operations has
established two Fleet Work Study groups with the mission of help-
ing obt in the optimum use of the human and material resources
available to the operating forces* Valuable assistance is at
hand for this project, in the form of a group of petty officers
(the FNC and PN1 rates) with some training in this area*
What are some of the difficulties that are likely to
emerge in the establishment of a large scale approach to work
simplification? What are the best methods of avoiding some of
these predictable problems? What can be learned from tho
Since the average petty officer and junior officer has
not yet received the equivalent of the ten-hour course in work
simplification given on a nation-wide scale to civilian super-
visors at tho height of the war, it my bo said that tho operating
forces are at least fifteen yo ,rs behind industry in this important
field*




experience of the Bureaus and industry which cub cake Fleet Work
Study a successful reality? These cad similar questions are
exaoined in subsequent chapters*

CHAPTER III
TOE STATUS OF MODERN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT METHODS IN TOE NAVY
To understand more clearly the position of the Navy in regard
to formal application of tiouern management methods in general and
work oiLiplificj-tion in particular, it in veil to review the status
and background of these aspects of management in industry and to
observe the degree to which these methods have been adopted by the
Navy.
Beginning eighty years ago, the era of factory production as
it was originally developed by the industrial revolution ceo to am
end. The older "factory system" was swept away by the rise of
modern industrial aethods* These aethods were characterized by
assembly lines and mass production, by standardization of products
and practices, and by an emphasis on technology* The nev methods
were made possible by the introduction of nev sources of power—
electricity and internal combustion engines—by the invention of
hundreds of nev devices, and by a revolution in communication and
transportation* Modern aethods brought a complete change in the
whole fie«d of industrial production*
Accompanying these remarkable changes in production processes
came an awareness, on the part of the managers responsible for this
production, th*t customary management practices and attitudes vers
2
not suitable under the nev conditions* The problem vas to maxi-
mize the effectiveness of the nev machines and of the organizations
vhich operated then* From the thinking of the engineers and organi-
zational executives vho vere called en to face and solve the
Lawrence L* Bethel, Franklin S* Atvater, Gcorgo II* E* Smith
and Harvey A* Stackman, Jr** Industrial Organization and Management 4
(Nov Yorki McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc*, 1900), p* 12.""
2
George Filipetti, Industrial Management in Transition
(Homewood, Illinois* Richard D* Irwin, Inc., 1053), pp. 2-56*

13
tochiiic.il and organizational problems of this era came a philosophy*
a body of principle a and a system of practicos that have had a
profound effect upon the further expansion and development of the
institution of induotry—and of many other cultural institutions
n
ef the modem world. This philosophy vat oullod "Scientific
Management," and it can best be described as "the application of
4
an analytical approach to the problems of management*"
The leader of the scientific management movement was
Frederick W* Taylor, who believed that the principal objective of
management should be "to secure maximum prosperity for the employer,
coupled with maximum prosperity for each employee*" Taylor main-
tained that these objectives could be met by the acceptance of a
new philosophy ef industrial management, that of scientific method*
His greatest contribution was the advocation of a scientific
approach to the organization of work, a field in which rule—of-thumb
had formerly been dominant* Secondarily, his investigation to
obtain scientific data as to the best way for standardizing a task
with the least expenditure of effort formed the foundation for what
ft
is now known as time study* Further, his efforts pioneered in
incontive pay plans, scientific selection of employees, functional
organization, materials and tool standardization, modem produc-
tion control and numerous other techniques of value in management
«
today*
Although Taylor realized and stated that there was more to
the management of an industrial enterprise than management in the
workshop, his stress en efficiency at the shop level and the
3
L* P* Alford and H* ttusaell JGeatty, Principles of Industrial




Ibid * t pp. 27-28.
Ralph W* Barnes, notion and Time Study (New Yorki Joan
wiley and Sons, 1008). p. 13*

14
economics to bo gained through study of direct work caused attention
7
to bo drawn away from the nore general aspects of management*
Following closely on the work of Taylor came the efforts of
several othor students of scientific management. Notable among
these wero Frank B* Gilbroth, who dovolopcd motion study} his wife,
Lilian Gilbreth, who contributed both to notion study and the psy-
chology of DO.nagcr.iont j Harrison "Cuersoa, who observed that efficiency
servos the best interests of both the employer and employee) and
Henry L* Gantt, who emphasized that management is the leading of
humans r&thcr than the command of machinery* It was these and a
few other leaders who in thoir writings near the turn of the century
first described the nature of the science of management*
The scientific management movomont had many obvious advan—
.
tages and was widely accepted by industrial managers as offering a
source of greatly improved efficiency at little cost* Many success-
ful applications were made of Taylor's "shop management" techniques*
In the rush to capitalize on the new development* however, were many
managers who were anxious to make a good showing but who were
equipped only with a pseudo-scientifie knowledge* These "efficiency
experts'1 often introduced i..proved methods, but gave negligible
attention to the associated problems of human relations* Not only
was it characteristic of practitioners of this nature to ignore
and override normal worker roaction to change, but the conditions
of the time did not permit a considerate interchange between affected
workers and their managers* Once new methods were established,
many factory managers of th .t time unscrupulously cut rates when an
7Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management
(New Yorkt iic-Graw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959)7 p* 22,
Q
For short descriptions of the livos and contributions of the
leaders up to World War I see U* B* Drury, Scientific Management, _A




employee Bade what the manager felt vaa too much money* This
trao the "spoed-up" in its moat hypocritical fora—ender tho guise
of "science," Labor soon grow to fear ~»d hato "scientific
management*" The objections of labor to ouch tactics were so
acrimonious as to be partially effective to this day, doopito the
efforts of conscientious managers to overcome the objections And
to remove the reasons for them*
By about 1910 aoiontific management was under close and
hostile scrutiny by large elements of the society. Although tho
12possible increases in efficiency were widely recognized, " tho
numerous and veil-founded criticisms of tho system eventually
resulted, among other things, in the prohibition of time study
13
and premium puy in work for vhi oh federal funds vero appropriated*
For many years, labor organizations vere outspoken in their objoc-
14tions to the various featurea of scientific management*
Q
Drury, ag# cit *, p» 35,
Carroll K. Daugherty, Labor Problems in ,-aaorican Industry
(Bo ston i Houghton Liff lin Company, 1933)', "p* 94*
Dale Yoder, Personne l Management and Industria l Relations
(New York i Prentice-Hall, Inc«, 19ol), p, G98*
12
Ono estimate by Harrington Emerson which received vide
publicity was that "the railroads of tho nation could save a
million dollars a day by recognizing the techniques of modorn
scientific management*" See Yoder, j0j5. cit ,, p, 50* Writing in
1911 Harrington Emerson expressed his view: "It is unfortunate
that tho employer shies at the suggestion of a 10 per cent advance
cad pays scant if any attention to a 50 per cent inefficiency,
two-thirds of which may be his own fault*" Harrington Emerson, .
The Two Ivo Principles of Efficiency (New Yorkt The Engineering
L, gazino Company, 1917"J7 P» W9
•
13
This limitation remained in effect until 1947, when it was
modified. It was finally lifted completely in 1949*
14
Daugherty, op*' cit *, p* G98*

10
The First V/orld War focused attention on worker productivity
as had no previous event in history* Many notr and valuable contri-
butions in tho field of industrial manpower utilization cume into
use. Personnel classification received its first introduction on
a vido—sproad basis. Intelligence and skill tests and Job classi-
fication ctaao into use* The governments of the industrial nations
began to sponsor agencies interested in the productiveness of nan-
power* This great emphasis on the workforce as an element of
production resulted in the formulation of the body of management
doctrine that come to be known as Personnol Management*
Tho decades of the 1920s and 1930s wore marked by continued
attention not only to scientific management techniques and increas-
ingly complicated processos und products, but also by the increasing
importance of the field of personnel management* Tho rising power
of organized labor made both management and labor more and more
17
aware of the importance of manpower as an element of production*
Unfortunately) this period was marked by economic crises* The
reactions of both management and labor to these crisos, and the
increasing effect of government regulation, were more characteristic
of the between-wars era than was gradual muximization of organize—
18tional effectiveness through the development of improvod management*
Neverthe leas, the "second industrial revolution" preceded, and
despite the problems of the tiuc and despite many instances to the
contrary, production efficiency and personnel utilization reached
new highs*
15
Yodert op* cit ., p. 51*
Daugherty, oj>. cit ,* p, 715,
17
Pilipetti, op * cit ,, p. 139 et soqq *
"Such management /scientific management/ does not work
except with the heartiest consent and help of the men under it*"
Pilipetti, op , cit ** p, 135*

17
The coat significant contribution in the field of management
following the early days of the scientific management movement vua
the work of Henri Fwyol, a French industrialist* Ilia primary atten-
tion was directed at the administration of organizations* lie
emphasized, as h.-d Taylor, that effective management is to bo found
not in the uncovering of some divinely endowed individual, but in
the correct application of basic-principles* Fayol regarded the
elements of management as its functions* These he porceived to bet
planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and controlling*
Ilis observations, which wore first introduced into the thinking of
Lng lion-speaking managers in the late 1020s, fori? the basis for
most current thought on this subject, and to thut extent ho is the
Oft
real father of modern muia-gement theory **
There is little reason to believe that ^scientific management
had nearly as muck impact on the thinking of military loaders in
this country as it had on the thinking of their counterparts in
business* The military literature of the period offers little
evidenco to show that much attention was given to an analytic
approach to the problems of managing the military forces* On the
other hand, the military had a long history of interest in matters
of organization and leadership, affairs which have their counter-
part in tho business world. The decades of peace permitted the
development of a body of officers who received advanced education
at tho Army and Kavy War Colleges and other Postgraduate Institutions,
The officer educational systems of the ..rmed Forces were far in
advance of their time and only now are being oqualod by civil execu-
tive development programs* Several advanced techniques were adopted
by the Army and Navy including testing programs for classifying or
rejecting recruits and very large punched card installations for
10
Fill petti, op * cit ,, p. 155*
*"T.oontx and 0* Donne 11, op * ctt,,pp» 23-27* This is not to say
that current thinking doos net include an element which challenges
some of tho basic doctrine of modern mantgement theory*

18
the personnel accounting system of Che Bureau of Navigution. On
the whole, however, it would be diffioult to make a caao that the
military was much affected by con-cuporary management thought*
Since the First World War the dovolopajont of managerial
thoory &nd practico has rooeivod tho nttontion of Buoh a large
number of individuals that it is possible to list, their contribu-
tions only in the broadest torus* Tho problems of cv.n.-gcuent have
boon given attention by numerous businessmen, by teachers, by
agencioa of the government and by organizations devoted to tho
improvement of management* The studies of psychology and sociology
have helped significantly in the development of modern managerial
philosophy* Today a dynamic literature deals with the problems
and practices of tho management profession*
A few yoars after the introduction of the concept of
sciontifio management, tho practices of Industrial i-ianugexuent wore
sufficiently well developed and its disciplines sufficiently veil
formulated that programs of study loading to formal qualification
in Industrial Engineering and Business Management vcrc offered by
21
most major universities* ' ./hilo the state of affairs in business
and industry during tho 1930s was far from tranquil, there is no
question but that the management group in .acricau society vas
22
.growing in numbers and in awareness of its functions* tfith the
coming of V/orld V/ar II good management practices did much to
heighten war production* At a time when one fifth of the normal
labor force were occupied with military duties, industry converted
to a war-time basis, and by recruiting and training millions of new
workers, accelerated production* Spectacular results were achieved
through widespread introduction of modem methods in several fields,




Alford and Beatty, op * cit ., p. 34*
2
**Fili petti, jog. cit*, p. 208*

19
description of organizational relationships and man specifi cations
to locate manpower needs and wastes, and the development of several
extremely successful training programs* These methods had direct
peacetime application and undoubtedly influenced much of post-war
23
man< gement practice*
The formal introduction of industrial engineering to the
Navy toot place during tforld Vfar;ll* At that time tho Navy J'anage—
nont Engineering Offico was established and staffed with a group
of Naval officers recruited from industrial management and consul—
tent firms. This office, through various organisational changes,
evolved into the presont Navy Management Office (composed of both
Industrial Engineers and I'anagenent Analysists) which reports
24directly to the civilian executive level*
Following the end of the war, all Bureaus and large industrial
activities of the Navy set up industrial engineering groups, /iftor
the lifting of the ban on time study, Navy Industrial Engineering
efforts emphasized techniques of moasuring work performance* Sta-
tistical work measurement, engineered time standards and work
sampling are methods in cor.; on use* Methods engineering has also
received considerable attention* »'s industrial experience had
proved, remarkable savings could be and were achieved through the
use of improved work methods and techniques*
The number of industrial engineers in the liavy today is about
350* The numbor of persons engaged indirectly in the field or in
related fields is not known but appears to be substantial* The
status of industrial engineering in Naval shore establishments seems
to be comparable to that in most of the larger private organizations,
^3
Youer, op* cit *. pp. 23, 236; Filipetti, or> * cit *, p. 310*
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and there is no reason to believe that the it portanco of thia field
will diminish.
The chief post-wor dovoloruncnta in the civil vorld have
involved vider application and refinement of proved techniques.
Methods tine measurement and work factoring methods, for example,
are post-var refinements of earlier techniques* Planning and control
26
of operations havo boon increasingly emphasized* ".>n increasing
rate of application of industrial management techniques, rather than
the aero fact of their application, is probably the most important
"27
characteristic of the post—war management field*
Various programs have boen adopted by the technical Dureaus
to incroaoe the effectiveness of the work being performed* BUDOCKS,
for example, is concerned with shore station public works, which
includes building maintenance, care of utility systems and upkeep
28
of automotive equipment* Its program follows four main linesi
1* The development of a basic system for controlling work input,
planning, estimating, scheduling and the accumulation of
statistics for performance evaluation*
2* Engineered performance standards, emphasizing transferability
between stations*
3* Work simplification*
w 4* Engineered shop layouts*
29
According to the o x;c source, the techniques most used by
the Buroau of Aeronautics in its Overhaul and Repair operations
26
Filipetti, og* cit * t p, 310*
27
I bi d*, p. 311* As will bo emphasized hereafter this
characteristic is being modified at the presont time by an increas-
ing preoccupation on the part of largo elements of management with
automatic production equipment and electronic information-handling
systems* The war-developed mathematical analysis techniques, known
as Operations Uosearch or Operations analysis are now extremely
important techniques in the practice of management*





include tine study, methods study and engineering, materials
handling f plant equipment layout and .Utlity control* The Bureau
30
of Ordnance had a modest tvork simplification program and was.
in fact, a pionoor in statistical sampling, Presumably the com-
bination of these two bureaus into tho Bureau of Nuval Woapens
vill not hinder their previous progress toward tho adoption of
advanced industrial engineering practices*
The Bureau of Ships has an active industrial engineering
program in its shipyards, which are in the apparent position of
competing with commercial shipyards in a large portion of their
work. In the case of BUSH I PS, a dollar comparison with civil en-
terprise is more valid than is the case of many other Naval functions*
Under the pressure of this comparison. BU3HIPS has established a
creditable Management Improvement Program*
Toward the end of the Korean War, a Navy Hoport of Manpower * i
Utilization stated thatt
Formalized programs have * • • grown in numbers and effectiveness*
The Buroau of Ships, starting a year ago, is now well along in
its Production Planning and Control Program* All Naval ship-
yards have this program in one or more shops* The Bureau of
Aeronautics has instituted a formalized management program in
two air stations in the Overhaul and Repair production shops*
Due to the significant success of this program, called engineered
job performance standards, in tho two stations, the Bureau is
** oxpanding the program to all tho other Naval Air Stations having
Overhaul and Repair shops* Methods for simplifying operations
have increased both in quantity and quality, including a new
training program for supervisors by the Office of Industrial
isolations, a work simplification procedure for Supers field
activities, and the spread of the BuSandA Methods Improvement
Program to other bureaus and offices*
The sua of these considerations is to point out that the-
technical bureaus have an active interest in modern industrial
30
U* S. Navy Department, The Bureau of Ordnance Manual -
(Washington, D. C*i Government Printing Office, 1055), p* 510
31
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, Report on Manpower
Utilization United States Navy (Washington, D* C*t Government Print-
ing Office, 1053) | p. 3*
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engineering practice* Implicit in all of these programs ic an
emphasis on finding better ways to accomplish the work objective.
Not only are those approved methods the subject of study by en-
gineers, but the Navy has an aggressive plan for drawing proposals
for improvement from the men on the job* Beneficial suggestions
are invited from all workers, and civilians are offered tangible
rcwar -5 for suggesting improvements* The number of suggestions
adopted in 1903 was 23,000, and by 1008 this number had grown to
40,000*
A program for the instruction of workers and supervisors in
the basics of work simplification spread' to ue< fleet in 1947* In
that yoar the rating of Personnol Liaa was established, and a know-
ledge of work simplification was rcauirod of candidates for the
32
rating of TNI and PNC* The creation by Supers of special schools
to teach the fundamentals of work simplification (in connection
with a course emphasizing organization analysis) followed shortly
thereafter* Those schools also trained junior officers on a volun-
tary and apparently limitod basis* These "Class C" schools have
since produced many hundreds of officer and petty officer graduates
who have an understanding of work simplification*
In 1053 the Bureau of Naval Personnel published Navporo 18530
Work Simplification for Naval Units , which with its associated
instruction documents formed a basis for a do-it-yourself approach
to work simplification* The aim of these publications was to
assist officers and potty officers in locating problem areas,
analyzing these areas and installing improved work methods to
insure the efficient use of the Navy's manpower resources* Work
Simplification for Naval Units outlinod in easily understood terms
—i i-mIm i i « i - — iijii h m imi i I MMMMMM w
the basics oft Work distribution, work count, flow process analysis,
33
motion economy and space layout*
32
See BuPers Instruction 5202*14 (1950)*
33
The inclusion of those five functions in a single work
simplification program actually involves a grasp of a series of
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It night bo expected that the introduction of work simpli-
fication ideas into the fleet followed aa a natural result of the
encouragement of such ideas by the Bureaus, and the possession
of practical knowledge by a certain group of trained personnel.
Unfortuaatoly, thoro is little evidence of simplified procedures
finding their way ^o son* As ne~rly as can be determined, no
commander of fleet units has undertaken a systematic program on a
scale comparable to those programs developed by the Buroaus lead—
ing to better utilization of manpower* One observer, writing in
January, 1050, commented
|
&!any of the so proven methods and systems /for accomplishing
more with less manpower and money/ are already in use in the
Navy at the present tii.c, but there are two systems speci-
fically, work measurement and work simplification, that are
not being used throughout the N«ivy* This is especially true
as applied to the utilization of mi li tagr personnel.
This situation remains in effect today*
conoepts usually thought of as being included in methods study work*
The Navy concept of work simplification programs, then, involves
considerably more than "the organized application of common sense
to the process of doing work.*' F«r purposos of this paper, work
simplification is defined as including the five basic functions set
forth by Work Simplification for Naval Units * It is distinctly a
"supervisor—oriented" concept*
34
Thomas L* Coaroy, "Better Utilization of Military Manpower
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PUOBLEMS OF ilORK SIMPLIFICATION PROGRAMS
.. great deal of evidence shows thai the introduction of
vork ox L-.pl ifiction lo-ds to improved performance by organizations
in the accomplishment of their objectives vith a minimum of effort
and expense* LVcry consideration based on logical reasoning
commends an active prograa of work simplification in any organiza-
tion* Yot there are several factors which inhibit efforts to make
work siapler and easier* The fact that those resistive forces are
largely illogical, that they arise from intuitive objections rather
than reasonable ones* or that they are based on false preuises does
not reduce their potency* These objections cannot be ignored by
anyone associated vith a vork simplification project* They can be
reduced or avoided by skillful leadership; but to avoid them they
Bust be understood*
Ono of the characteristics of any program vhich changes the
operations of an organization is that the success of the nev progr.ua
depends largely on the willingness of the organization to adopt the
change* This is not always easily accomplished* Even the best of
engineered studies and similar improvements based on intellectual
decisions are often roaiated for emotional reasons by the workers
and supervisors who are expected to adopt them* Work simplifica-
tion, being a cooperative venture at improving work, is especially
Vulnerable to patterns of resistance* It has been estimated that*
for one reason or another, over half of the proposals for improve-
ment are put forth at least six times before they are finally adopted/
For brief amplifications of this observation see Bethel,
op * cit*, p # 414 jtt seq^ *» and Leherer* •£ cit », p. 251*
Charles F* ..ustin, "The Loneliest Man in the Military, the
Man vith a Nev Idea," Armed Forces ?,lanaftenontt V (ilarch, 1959). p* 27*
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This sulcata tho potency of the negative attitudes thai can groet
ovon tho boat—motivatod suggcatioaa*
The introductioa of largo-scale work amplification programs
bringa forth two c.togorica of probloma: problema centcrod around
individuals and problems arising frou tho naturo of organizations.
Of these, the problcna of individuala are voll-defiaed uad thoroughly
diacuased is current literature Oa the subject* The aecoad category
ia largely undefined, aad secma to bo uoat pronounced ia decentral-
ized organizational This chapter briefly reviews the problems aaso—
elated vith individuals, mainly ia tho interest of aokaovlodging
their existence and aoting that certain factors Lend to counter the
reaiative tendencies of individuals* Tho main intent of uhis cbuptor
ia to examine some of the predictable, but goaerally undefined prob-
lems associated vith the introduction of vork simplifioation programs
into large decentralized organisations.
PROBLEMS CENTERED AROUND INDIVIDUALS
The participation of an individual in a vork simplification
program ia Boat often compromised by two factors, his rcai stance
to change and bio resentment of real or implied criticism, ihese
are underatandable reactions* for everybody intuitively seeks
security—which changes threaten—and nobody likes the implication
that adhorence to a vork situation which could be improved reflects
on the competence of the individuals involved in the old system*
Specific factors which influence individual reactions to new
a
and changed work conditions arc the following*
Fear of loss of .job or statu a . Although the fear of job
leas is minimized by membership in the armed forces* a closely
allied problem* threat of loss of status must be contended with by
John II* Pfiffner, The Supervision of 1'craonnel (Englevood
Cliffs* New Jerseys Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1058)* p* 117 et segc^
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any program bringing forth changed procedures* A new program
which tonda to reduce the influence or apparent importance of an
individual will undoubtedly be resisted by that individual*
Custonary working habits and org .nizational relationships trill be
vievod moat favorably by a person who has achieved success undor
tho customary conditions*
Desire for security * The uncertainty accompanying tho
introduction of revised work patterns runs counter to the universal
desire for stability and security* Fear of the unknown is a natural
and probably unavoidable reaction*
Resist? nee bjr supervisors and managers * The desire to pre-
serve a vested interest is probably stronger in supervisors than
in workers* There are possibilities that a questioning attitude,
encouraged by a work simplification program, uight reveal embar-
rassing short comings* It often occurs that the higher the rank
of the individual* the less secure he nay be in his position*
This nay be especially true in the Nf.vy where the decisions of
rar.ny high ranking officers are made in an atmosphere which does not
allow then to forgot that their careers are ueasured at frequent
intervals by an uncompromising system*
Inpli ed cri ti ci am * The implication of any proposed improve-
ment is a criticism of the existing procedures* It is next to
impossible to criticize a method without criticizing the person
doing the job* the one responsible for it, or tho person who pre-
scribed that method in the first place* People usually resent
criticism* It is necessary to recognize this situation and deal
4
with it effectively if we expect improvements to bo acceptable*
Gordon B* Carson (ed.), Production Handbook (New York t The
Ronald Press* 1958). p* 14,4*

27
Individual rosistn.nco to change and reaentacnt, of criticioa
can be countered by influencing ^ttitudos and developing a team
approach to tho solution of work problems. There are aoac T017
poworful psychological forces which can be haraosoed to partially
roiuco tho nogativo reactions of individuals to proposals of
change
•
People like to participate in group activity* Practi cal ly
everyone likes to bo on a team. Tbo very fuct of mutual participa-
tion c!< unh to alleviate the ill effocts of resistance to change
and resentment of criticism*
People like to try to improve *- Unless they are inhibited by
an outside forco people are often motivate*', to improve the situa-
tions in vhich they find thomselvec*
People have certain other universal deairca* Many of these
desires can be fulfilled by an active program of work simplification*
Chief among these arot
We want to work for people who arc understandings human and
appreciate us as individuals*
We want to believe in our own feeling of importance in the
scheme of things*
Wo vant confirmation by others of our right to enjoy our self-
respect in the form of recognition, esteem and honor*
We want to associate with people who are more import -at than
ourselves*
We Went any feeling of increased importance to manifest itself
in increased earnings.
We want to share in the tangible results of our own efforts*




PROBLEMS ClfflERTID AROUND ORGANIZATIONS
There are * number of reactions to change that are core
character! otic of organizations than of individuals. Soue of
those are well-known* Othors only become apparent after examina-
tion of the reactions of large-scale organizations*
The leveling tendency of informal organization is well-
known* i:any human organizations tend to resent and isolate those
who demonstrate superior competence* Thus, tho informal organiza-
tion froquently adds its opposition to new idocs to the opposition
of individuals as a means of preventing spectacular porformanco*
Tho introduction of changes requires increased effort and '
output from organizations* In addition to ^ke direct offort of
formulating the proposal and installing the new system, problems
of re-appraising indirectly affected areas—such as personnel
policies* training programs, equipment requirements and the like—
require the attention of portions of the organization which would
not bo affected had the change not occurred*
The overall requirements of largo organisations tend to
inhibit sub-units from introducing substantial changes* The effect
of tradition, of "doing things because wc have always dono them,"
is especially marked in military organizations* One reason for
this is that the work of sub-units is to a large extent dependent
on decisions of higher authorities* IJany of these decisions are
not predictable by. sub-units* A unit which changes its habits
to improve its present performance may find that its new systems
do not conform to newly* issued "standard?' orders from above*
Further, an organization must be prepared to show its
literal compliance with the expressed requirements of higher
authorities, even though proposed improvements could accomplish
with less effort tho objectives set up by the higher authority*
The approval of proposals by several higher love Is may requiro an
inordinato expenditure of effort* The old method may in fact be
retainod because of the high cost of proposing a new one* These
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factors tend to cause sub-units to do little tew;.rd changing the
There is reason to beliovo that auny military organizations
kavo grown up around certain work-ccatcrs and that traditional
work methods are associated with organisations of a cortaiu pattern*
All organization might be uotivatod to decide that a particular
function could bo more efficiently discharged by a portion of the
organisation which had not previously been involved in the particu-
lar typo of work* In this case, the proposal could not be judged
on its merits alone, but would havo to be reviewed in the light of
traditional responsibility patterns within the organization* Thus
certain spaces are set asido in ships for the performance of certain
work* The fact that in the course of events the work could moat
effectively bo performed olsowhero brings up not only the question
of "where can this work best bo performed," but, also an unrelated
quostion: "What spaces were provided by the builders of the ship
for this work, and in whoso dominion are those spaces?" Similarly
tactical squadrons find* when they are b^sed ashore* that the tele-
phone aystcxa is tailored to fit a "standard" squadron and that a
re-organization must take into consideration who will get the tele-
phone calls meant for whom* The personnel allowance provides per-
sonnel for specific billets* and the fact that these jobs nay
require dilution or expansion brings up questions unrelated to the
proposod expansion or dilution* The "standard methods" taught by
training schools tend to bo retained in the fleet long after they
huve been declared obsolete and abandoned by the school* A scuadroa
aaauuios a heavy training burden in attempting to change a work method
taught bj a service school* 11© cause organizations "always" havo
beon organized in a particular manner* -here is a tendency for them
to retain their old form even when a newer one might be more suitable*
The traditional assignment of responsibilities to Commanding
Officers makes many functions "command responsibilities" whon these
eould more effectively be performed centrally* Under this system,
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each unit performs many functions at low efficiency, which arc
also performed at low efficiency by neighboring units* Dutioa
requiring a high t'ogreo of stall but which aro only occasionally
performed offer good illustrations cf this point* The functions
of unit local officers aro perhaps the hoot exnap|c« A unit 'cannot,
discharge ita legal responsibilities without being staffed with
soncono who has a good knovlcdgo nf legal proceduros* There are
many occasions when legal matters do not occupy a full-tiuo legal
staff. Yet each command Bust retain this trained talent.
.'mother factor which tends to inhibit the growth of work
simplification practices in military units is tho fact that one
aspoct of a work aimplifi cation program seems to run counter to
the more*. of tho profession* This ia the "questioning attitude,"
which challenges the validity of methoda ia use. The questioning
of tho edicts of higher authority requires a level of tactfulncsa
not often found, and one suspects that the aortal! fcy rate of good
ideas is increased vhea more than one level of military authority
is involved
Another organisational limitation which intorferea with the
adoption of revised programs by cub-units is the question of
responsibility* Let us naRime that a Commander has several dozen
units which are following outmoded practices* Some of these units
are aware, as ia the Comru-ru'er, that their operations .re excessively
costly, but most are not* (The upkeep practices of destroyers pro-
vide a ^ood illustration of this situation*) tfhoso responsibility
is it that these units udopt tho most advanced practices? Article
0704 of UaitcJ States Navy Regulations requires that a Commanding
Officer maintain his command in a stete of maximum effectiveness*
IJ&ch of the destroyer CCs will swear that his ship ia performing at
its best* Does full responsibility lie on the Commanding Officer
who may be unav.ro of the problem? Questions of responsibility Lave
one traditional—and no simple answer*
A final character! stio of organizations which interferes with




which has appeared in socio of the central ly-adninisterod Kavy
programs* In a typical c.sc, organizations engaged in a work
simplification program arc directed to report the costs of certain
types of simplified vork to a central authority* This authority
then compares the reports, and evaluates the aucceoc of the various
activities in conducting their affairs* Needless to say, this can
easily lead to incorrect conclusions* for local conditions often
influence vork situations which art outwardly standardized*
Apparently several of the Bureau-instituted programs have becouo
entangled in the problems of standardised procedures—a deceptively
complicated area* For this and similar reasons, there is some
b.sis for the belief that centralized control may be too inflexible
to allow detailed central administration of >;ork sinplifi cation
programs* - - ; . ••> •
The sua of these considerations of the problems of adapting
work simplification to large organizations suggests that there are
some very potent forces within organizations which tend to countor
innovations* Unlike the problems centered around individuals* there
seem to be fov specifics to remedy these weaknesses* Chief among
the oo unsolved problems ares
1* The resistive influence of the informal organization*
2* The increased effort initially required to prepare and
institute simplified programs*
3* The vulnerability of sub-units to decisions made higher up,
and the burden on sub-units in acquiring approval for other
than "standard" techniques*
4* The influence of traditional organizational patterns and
vork methods which toad to persist despite efforts to modify
them*
Anita P. Locber, "Work Reduction and Measurement Techniques*"
quoted in Colver Gordon, (ed«), Ideas For Hum ficment, Papers and
Case ni stories Presented at the Eleventh ..nnual International
Systctr.3 Meeting (Forge "village, Massachusetts! The Murray Printing
Company, 1059), p. 250#
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5, The assignnont of certain functions to certain unite without
regard for economical vork distribution*
G. The problon of challenging the status quo in nilitury organi-
zations,
7. The question of logical aasigmaont of responsibilities in
large vork oinplifi cation programs.
8* The inflexibility of centralized control*

CHAPTER V
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL WOKK SIMPLIFICATION PliOGRAilS
In 1054, as a prelude to establishing its ova work eiaplifi-
cation program, Seara, Roebuck and Company conducted a ourvoy of
companies known to have experience in work siaplifi cation* Out of
207 leading United States coupaniou querried, 129 responded to the
Sears survey and of these. 85 with the cost active programs were
subjected to detailed examination. The companies ranged in size
froa 250 to 40*QOO~plu* employees, and included such well-known
organizations as Minneapolis-Honeywell, Du Font, Consolidated Edison
of Detroit*
The practical dollar value of the programs was very signifi-
cant. One of the larger organizations attributed savings of over one
million dollars per yoar to its program of work simplification* One-
tenth of the companies reported savings ranging from 100,000 to
750,000 dollars per year* Other savings ranged from 2,000 dollars
per your upward, with savings of 30-50,000 dollars per year not being
uncommon. These figures ropresent returns of 200 to 1,200 dollars
for each dollar invested in the work simplification program* Over a
third of the companies estimated savings at a ratio of five dollars
returned for each dollar invested, and other estimates ranged from
"lcoa than 2 to 1" to "about 20 to *•»*
While it must be realized that the study involved only com-
panies known to be biased in favor of. the programs, that "savings"
are difficult to estimate accurately, and "costs of the program"
evon more so, and further that one vould expect the law of diminish-
ing returns to reduce savings as tisae passes, it is nevertheless
This information is from Loherer, ©£# cit .. p. 251, et seqq ,
which summarizes F« W. Simoroon and \Y. D. Teat, Work S
i
up 1 i f i ca t i on
Survey (Chicagoj Sears, Roebuck and Company, 1954). Additional
information is from "Work Simplification—Why It Clicks and Why It




apparent that significant stops toward tho efficiency of tho com-
panies can bo traced to their interest in vork simplification.
An important finding of the study vaa that many benefits
not measurable in dollars ~lso f loved from the vork simplification
programs* Improvod attitudes often accompanied official encourago—
cent of participation in vork improvement projects* Personnel
development occurred as elements of the organisations g-vc attention
to other than routine natters* Logical examination of procedures
often helped devolop initiative and a cooperative spirit in improving
those procedures* Somo of the companies hud found their programs so
useful for reasons of this nature that they stated that non-monetary
benefits far outweighed the direct dollar returns*
The programs followed by these 85 companies often had certain
characteristics in common* Host notable among these vorei
1* Almost all successful programs were formal programs in
continuous operation*
2* The successful programs had sincero support from management
at all levels*
3* Some formal training in basic vork simplification procedures
had been given to most managers and to many additional members
of the organizations*
4* Successful programs vers conducted under tho leadership of
eitheri
(a) Line management only*
(b) Line management in conjunction vith the organization's
industrial engineering departments, and/or
(o) Line management in conjunction vith vork simplifica-
tion coordinators*
5* Wide participation vas encouraged, usually by one or more
devices similar to the following:




(b) Suggestion systems, cither of tho "suggestion box" or
" chain-of-corjuanu" type •
(c) Work simplification toams assigned to spocific depart-
ments or specific projocts*
(d) Special publicity toohniquoa (newspaper artiolca,
bulletin board displays, meetings, awards, etc*)*
6* Projects could be originated either by workers* supervisors
or staff groups*
7* .Adequate skill could be brought to boar on specific problcus*
Experienced supervisors* industrial engineers or tho work
simplification coordinators were committed to assist workers
in developing their proposals*
8* The protection of the integrity of the program was a matter
or considerable concern* "Successful work simplification
projects cannot bo regarded as a means of exploitation*
They are programs for personal development and expression
i which eliminate waste of resources" typifies the expressions
of the companies on this subject*
0* Host of the programs (two-thirds) offered no tangible rewards
for improvements*
Soveral of tho characteristics identified bj the Sears study
as- applying to successful work simplification programs deserve
specific attention by persons interostod in applying work simplifi-
cation techniques to Naval units* A briof examination of the
subject indicates that the operating forces have all the mechanisms
necessary to apply work simplification in an organized program and
suggests that the program now in its initial stages can be extremely
successful* Favorablo characteristics of the Navy program are as
follows*"
OTNAV INSTRUCTION 5250*1* February, 1960, which describes
the programj "Fleet \"ork Study Program," Kuval Management, (May, 1060),
p*23, which elaborates on tho instruction, are the sources of infor-
mation on the yet-to—be—initiated program*

so
1. The Fleet .i'orL Study iTograci has high level cucouragoj3ont f
boing sponsored by CI.'O and BUPlItS and managed by CNO*
2. . Staff advisory talent (20 officers aud senior petty officers)
is available for assignment to projects.
3. TLe protract m-hea adequate allowance for voluntary accoptunce
and installation of improvement by fleet units* It encourages
initiative at the unit level and reduces the possibility of
conflict between staff end line authorities.
Although the auguries for the Fleet Work Study Program are
favorable, two disconcerting factors appear ia a comparative view of
industrial practices and the Navy program*
The most important of these is that a successful work simpli-
fication projoct requires full and sincere management (i • c., command)
support, at all levels, tfhethor this support will bo forthcoming is
a critical question* CNO and BUPSTiS encouragement of similar
projects through the last decade, as we have seen, cannot be said
to have had significant impact on customary working habits in the
fleet* This may partially due to the indeterminable nature of
responsibility for success of a program which is based on cooperation
4
rather than command* Further, the Work Simplification Program has
been only one of many programs* It has received, historically, con-
siderably less emphasis than, say, the Jafe Driving Program, The
Material Conservation Program or the numerous fund-raising campaigns*
Thon, too, a certain amount of training is required before most
people—especially key personnel—can understand tho nuances of such
a program} and this training has not been conducted on a sufficient
scale to expect that the persons who would have to carry out such a
program were actually competent to do so*
3
5ee for example 0PN..V INSTUUCTION 4100*1 of 1051 and BUPERS
INSTRUCTION 5202.14 ef 1966, both of which stross the need for
improved practices, manpower and material conservation, otc*
xliis problem is examined in detail in the following chapter*
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The second cauoo for concern which should prove easily
avoidable since the shore establishment has accumulated a ^oou deal
of experience vith it is the problem that arises when a central
authority establishes noras for decentralized units* So far thero
has boon no indication that the Fleet Work Study project will "over
coordinate" in this manner* There in every reason to hope that
staff-approved procedures will not be proposed as the only accep-
table methods for use in the fleet*
If these two problems—line support and the avoidance of the
implication of coercion—can be solved, the Fleet Work Study Program,
like similar programs in industry, can be expected to produce hand-
some returns on a modest investment*

CHAPTER VI
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR NAVAL UNITS
The preceding chapter is intended to show that a Fleet Work
Simplification Program is a much-needed and highly practical
activity promising great savings in manpower and money* This
chapter adds the concept of "the 'system," or as often referred to,
"the operational system" or the "administrative and work system*"
* system nay be defined as "the standardized operation of an
organization in meeting ono of its objectives*" A system is illus-
trated by the following descriptions
Consider a * * * situations that which arises when the
passengers disembark from a ferry-boat* Tho boat approaches
the quayside, its passengers ready; the port officials await
its arrival* The whole situation is a cystous a machine
for disembarkation*"
Tho essence of the thoughts expressed in this chapter is
that in tho example of the ferry-boat, it will bo all very well to
simplify the duties of the customs officials, the baggage-handling
crew and the disembarking passengers, but the real problem is one
of improving tho whole system, rather than tho work of the indi-
viduals involvod* An analysis of alternatives may show that tho
for similar definitions see David Giudoff, "Getting the
Most out of Manual Methods and Devices," Workshop for Msn-^cnont •>
(Greenwich, Connect! cuts The Management Publishing Coupany, 1950),
p* 100$ Robert .U McGowan in Victor Laaarro, (ed*), Systems and
Procedures (Englewood Cliffs, Mow Jorseys Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950),
p. vij and Fri.uk .';* Lamperti and John D. Thurston, Internal Auditing '
for Management (Engleaood Cliffs, New Jerseys Prentice-Hall, lac*,
195G), p. 67.
2
"Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management (Now Yorks John
Wiley and Sons, 1959), pp* 21-22* Mr* Doer is the head of the
Operations Research Department of the United Steel Companies, Ltd*
of Britain* The quote continues, reflecting the flavor of the
British view and the realities of a system in operation: "And what
happens? A great deal of shouting and turmoil begins, and continues
for a long time* In the course of this passengers are pushed to and
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tho ferry-boat should bo eliminated in favor of a bridge* Moat
viowa of work simplification do not take into account the much
bro. der cystous concept* One way of looking at this difference,
perhaps, ia that vhoroas work siciplifi cation has been cuto^ori~od
as to being engineer— worker— supervisor-oriented, the systems
concopt involves the lovol of an organization which assigns objec-
tives to that organization* oyatcus are distinctly "management—
oriented*"
The systems concept has come into focua during the yoara
since the Second './'orId V.'ar*
Modern statistical techniques and knowledge froia different
scicacoa were used /during tforld ..ar II/, sometimes with
striking effectiveness, in the comparison of military tactics,
such as the various deployments of aircraft and ships, ..a
these studies were used to assist in the operational decisions,
they cane to bo known as 'operations research** oinco the war
this general approach lias been applied also to military devel-
opment and procurement problems, which has meant poering
further into the future, including a greatly expanding number
of variables, examining a wider n.ugo of possible aciioua,
and taking higher—level alternatives into account* This
comparison of such enlarged systems of interrelated elements
has ofton boon called 'systems analysis.'
During the past decade analytical Investigation of systems has been
increasingly used to holp buninous firms increase their profits,
fro, their luggage trampled, their tenpors increasingly frayed*
..ftor somo long delay of considerable discomfort and worry thoir
trains eventually leave the quaysiae—probably at times grossly
different frou those forecast in the itinerary. Those passengers,
luckless people, philosophically accept the situ tion as typical
of modern life* They accept that they are being • controlled*'
The inference ia presumably drawn from tho f>..ct that there are
officials standing about wearing b *dgeo of office and issuing
instructions*'4 Mr* Deer's introduction of the idea of "control"
is an important factor in* tho concept of a system, as will bo
explained hereafter*
3
Iloland N* McKenn, Efficiency in Qovornnonfc Through Systems
Analysis (New York: John li'ilcy and Sons, 1008), (Copyright held
by the liand Corporation), p* 7*
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and "virtually all of the dofenso budget is believed io contain
opportunities for using /systems/ analysis to good advantage
"
As might be expected, tho analysis of a system can be a
very complex operation, "Systems analysis encompasses tho doeign
of planning tools for giving direction to the enterprise's
activities—tho development of program.? for determining what should
happen in tho future; and the design of control tools to insure
that the plans are effected and the results ovuiuated."
One of tho developments which has accentuated the system
concept is tho introduction of computers into business organizations*
"The impact of reoont technical innovations has forced many managers
to take a second looL at their organization, particularly /in regard
to/ the advent of modern data-processing equipment • • • Where
managers have used it as moro thnn simply a change in •hardware',
the equipment has triggorred sweeping revisions /in organizations
and methods/. To prepare information efficiently for tho process-
ing equipment, managers havo completely reorganized traditional
departments* In this connection there are the telling, though
perhaps exaggerated, stories of companies that have revised their
organizations in anticix>'»-tion of the delivery of data-pro ceasing
equipment only to realize such great savings through the reorgani-
zation process itself that they cancelled the orders for tho
equipment*"
4
Ibid *. p. 279.
Norman N* Bari oh, Systems ..na lysis for Effective Adminis-
tration (New Yorki Funk and .*agnall3 Company, 1951} , p* 2, as
may bo inferred from tho date, this book offors a very basic
approach to the understanding and analysis of systems* It lists
twenty-four handy principles for tho design of administrative
systems* while this description of the cardinal rules is of
considerable value, the emphasis placed on such matters as forms
control and lay-out analysis borders on over-simplification*
R
Frank J* Jasinski, "Adapting Organization to the New
Technology," Harvard Business Review , 1&XV11 (January-February,




Several specific characteristics surround a system* Those '
characteristics deal with;
1. The flow of information*
2* The integration of functional authority*
3* The characteristic of control*
4* The factor of complexity*
5* The contribution toward organizational effectiveness*
A system is built on a framework* This framowork is the
pattern of flov of information vithin an organization vhich leads
to the accomplishment of an objective* "A prominent industrial
leader has said* *No physical activity goes on in our modern age
vithout a piece of puper moving along with it* In most cases,
several pieces of paper are used (not necessarily required) to got
physic. 1 activity accompli shod *•" Min the United Stales, /porhapa/
40 per cent or better of the total national effort goes into com-
muni cations* computations, and /paperwork/ •" "An integrated
business systom can be viewed as a communication process* Trans-
actions occur, are recorded, and the reoord communicated or stored*
• • In an integrated business system, throe activities can be dis-
tinguished] (a) Information flow, direct transfer, (b) information
acknowledge, "A fow firms havo placed letters of intent to purchase
computers in order to got on waiting lists* Some of these have
altered their original orders /as a result of the benefits derived
from detailed studios of their systems/*" Goorge Kozmetsky and
Paul Kircher, Electronic Computers and Man^cnent Control (now Yorkx
McGraw-Hill Cook Company, Inc., 1956), p* 214*
7
Milton Ilolzhaeuser, "The Work Simplification Concept,"
Work oho p> for Management (Greenwich, Connecticut! The Management
Publishing Company, 1956), p* 211
«
William B* Worthington, "Basics of Electronic Systems,"
Ideas for ?U.n;.p;oment (Forge Village, Massachusetts! The Murray
Printing Company, 1950), p* 359*
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pro coos, roport combining, and (o) information analysis, decision
branching;* "At this stage, the general principle which can be
doduccd is that a . • • system is no loose conflux of events, but
a tightly knit network of information."
The sooond characteristic is that aysteas integrato func-
tional authority. Dy nature thoy minimize traditional concopts of
scalar levels and departmentalization. "An integrated business
system links the event that originates an itea of information with
the events that occur whenever and wherever someone uses this in-
formation." "Traditional business organization runs on a vertical
line, relying almost solely on superior-subordinate relationships.
Orders and instructions go down the line; reports and requests go
12
up the line." says one observer. "Frequently* the traditional.
formally defined vertical relations in business and industrial
13
organization prove inadequate to cope with modern technology."
"Frederick W» Taylor and many others foresav that only through a
more specialized approach to division of effort could large enter-
prises be developed and managed ... /but/ wo now see that speciali-
zation is not an unmixed blessing. Carried beyond a certain point,
the theory of division of effort begins to create more problems than
it selves ... The new industrial creed may well come to be termed*
14improvement through integration of effort." "In almost all cases.
systems are largely the result of a series of semi-related historical
Door, op . cit., p. 23.
iCozmetsky and Kircher. cp . cit «. p. 160.
12
Jasinslci. op . cit ., p. 80.
13
Ibid., p. 8G.
14A. V. Feigenbaum. "The Approach. Analysis >.nd Design of
a System." Idoas for Mcnaffcmcnt (Forgo Village. Massachusetts.




accretions." "Ilunagcmcnt attention to this fiold begins with
the proniso that coat important industrial operating elements are
really indopendont parts of a broader systoiaj and that efficient
function/ing/ of a oyster: is greater thun the sun of tho efficiency
of its parts* • *. Tho hoy parts of this oyotoia involve its objoc-
tives, policies, organization, physical resources, manpower, finan-
tial rosources and procedures* It recognizes that systematizing
the interrelated functioning of these elements requires far more
than what vo have historically known as procedures work."
The ossonce of a system is the idea of control or corrective-
ness* Control is an attribute of a system, but "control" is used
17in a special sense to indicate "self-regulation." A management
control system may be a set of policies, procedures /and tho related/
information processing which is designed to give direction to
activities by clearly establishing goals, by measuring progress
toward these goals and by indicating or initiating corrective
18
action*
The essential problem in control involves feed back of vital
information and this process, of course, is closely related to the
framework upon which all systems are built, the flow of information*
One factor pervading any analysis of a system is that a
system may be exceedingly complex* "A system consists of x
15
Kozmetsky and Kircher, op* cit .* p. 117*
Foigenbaum, op * cit , 8 p* 55, . It certainly involves far
more th<m the traditional concept of industrial engineering, which
states that "the end result of the industrial engineering function
is cost reduction*" See H. B. Kayn«-rd, Industrial Engineering
Handbook (New York. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 195G), pp* 1-37*
17
Beer, off * cit ., pp* 0-28.
18
Donald G. Hal com, Real-Tine S'ian<;gecent Control in a Lar^o
Scale f,!an-?.?achlne System (Santa Monica, California j The Systems
Development Corporation, 1959), p* 3*
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clcncnts. Before we started talking about systons, this would
have moant x investigations to find out what this sot of tilings
tras like* Oaco wo declare this sot of things to be a eysoeu,
however, there are not only x olencnts theuisolvca to examine, but
x (x — 1) relations betwoeu the elements to be examined*"
This complexity is introduced by emphasis on functional
authority. Directives "coning fr,oxa acvoral different functional
executives nay overburden operating people, and occasionally they
nay even conflict rrith each other* Consider, for example, the
district sales supervisor who receives instructions for rather
elaborate accounting records from the chief accountant, training
directions along with requ03t3 for frequent individual ratings
from the personnel director, elaborate and glowing instructions
regarding the next sales campaign from the sales promotion direc-
tor, and weighty instructions from the leg.s.1 counsel, all in
addition to what presumably are the major orders received froia his
lino supervisor, the sales manager* • • Each of the executives
with functional authority is empowered to go directly to operating
supervisors, *nd only occasionally is provision made for some cen-
tral clearance * . • to make sure that all directions when combined
20
together, make a consistent, do-able assignment*"
Systems can also be relatively simple* The power to assign
objectives to portions of organizations is held by many function-
aries* ..hen these persons are Admirals, the systems c -lied for
are likely to bo rather complex* On the other hand, janitors may
also introduce systems*
19
Beer, dp* cit*, pp. 10, 12, 17, 98.
20
This paragraph is largely quoted from Newman, op * cit *,
p. 195. A related concept that Newman brings out is that "use of
functional authority tends to weaken the influence of the line
supervisor." This is further reflection of the contention that
departmentalization tends to restrain integration.
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The final characteristic of A system ia thai it contributes
to the effectiveness of an organization* Since & system is devoted
to meeting cue of the objectives of an org-nidation, it absorbs
some of the x-osourcca of the organisation in the intorcst of meet-
ing that objective, SystotiS can, of course, uaLo a minus contri-
bution tovurd the mission of the organization* An effective system,
21hovever, cukes positive intentional contribution to the objective*
THE PT-OBLTZI OP SYSTEMS RESPONSIBILITY
As illustrated by the case of the overburdened sales supervi-
sor, an increase in activity by functional authorities can seriously
on
interfere with the primary duties of line authorities/" The
problem of developing effective systems raises on important points
vho is responsible for the efficiency of the system? Unfortunately,
there is no clear answer to this question and several traditional
concepts of responsibility appear to conflict with any requirement
that a central authority assume responsibility for the correct
functioning of a system*
The Nuvy concept of responsibility requires that unit
Commanders assume responsibility for all occurrences within their
units* Yet many* many Navy systems operate across unit boundaries
and not in a vertical direction only* A substantial number of
communications (indications that systems exist) pass up and down
the chain-of-command betwocn unit Coux:anders and their superiors
and subordinates* But another very substantial number pass between
the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department and the various
21
W* W. Suojanen* "Effectiveness, Efficiency and Economy in
Military lliuuigciae&t," Unpublished Manuscript* 1059, p* 2*
22
Ac will be recalled, Taylor's plan for functional control
of workers by eight functional bosses fulled completely*
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units* Functional instructions are issued directly to Commanders
of all fillips and stations by many officials outside tho cLi-iu-of-
command* ..luoiit all of these instructions and communications -re
part of a systematic operation for meeting an objective—-a fly a torn*
Exuuino tbo similarity Let-eon oLe aituutioa of the line
supervisor in the following c^so, awl tho position of the Navy unit
Commander; *
Each division issued its ova directives* In finance, for
example, when a particular problem wua encountered, the
manager would write a directive and distribute it to the
entire organization explaining this particular feature or
that particular feature about tho subject in rjuoation*
His cohort down the line, at the sane level, would then
issue a memorandum which morely touched upon the Finance
problem, but which really dealt, let's say, with Publio
Relations* Tho line supervisor, down at the middle man-
agement level, was receiving eommuni cations from three or
four sources touching oa the same subject material* So 2 _
the line supervisor was really in an undesirable position*
The line supervisor described in tho foregoing case is a
Tietin of sub-optimisation. Each superior authority has examined
the problem at hand not from the overall view of the entire organi-
zation, but from the view only of the particular bureau or office
he heads* This approach has "optimized" the situation with certain
sub-portions of the organization* Each authority has "sub-
24
optimized*" Should the authorities direct that action be taken
25
by a very large number of supervisors* without analyzing the
23
Clifton ft* Irvine and Robert J* Koch, "procedures Control
and Analysis Techaiquosj A concept of Work Simplification,"
Workshop f or Management (Greenwich, Connect! cutt The Kanagcment
Publishing Company, 105G), p* 217*
24
For a good description of sub-optimization, soo Roland N*
UcKean, op * cit », p* 31. Efficiency in Government Through Systems
Analysis makes a very strong case for analyzing government systoms
in the interest of gotting hotter results for tax expenditures.
25
Or* flay* "All Ships and Stations."
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system tc assuro that it. is designed fcr efficient operation, the
resulting wasted cffor*- can be enormous as c.\ck supervisor tries
to "coivO" as best he can.
Tho foregoing cedents arc not offered in ft spirit of
criticicm, fcr oven among tho host—cuaajjcU organisations, ra;.ny are
found that have cot yet solved the problem of responsibility for
optimising the efforts of tho organi action. Few organisations are
as large or as decentralized as i3 the hravy, and this problem is
particularly acu^e in decentralized organisations* Peter F* Drucker
has stated
i
Then ti-Lo tho trend tovard decentralization of industry* This
is a very nieleading tern because it obacurco Uio fact thut
you cannot decentralize without very much better controls of
porforu.-nce, very xauch bet-er controls of objectives, than
most businesses have ever heard of • Decentralization means
th..t you set up a unit autonomously in such a manner that it
operates against standards, objectives and goals rather than
against supervision* The major problem is a control problem
which very few businesses undorntand or have the controls fop*
llany who go ahead and decentralize are going to rue the day*
Although tho problem of responsibility for efficient systems
has not boon effectively solved by many very enterprising organi-
zations, thoro arc indications that it is being solved more effec-
tively in certain organisations than in the N~vy* One of the in-
dications is that a long list of prominent companies ~ssign
considerable talent to this particular problem, or some variation
of it* Any number of companies specifically assign "Systems
Lnginceriug Groups" or "2'launing and Procedures Departments" to
this field* So far, it is not apparent th^t the 11 vy has given
much attention to its systems, with the possible exception of the
occasional efforts of the Navy Management Office to serve in the





role of & management consultant to the operating forces.
Why is it that systems should require the attontion of
highly competent systems analysis groups, despito the fact thut|
by and large, cost of the personnel of an organization are
thoroughly qualifiod, sinooro poraons who aro doing thoir work
in what they consider to be the best manner? The following
reasons, it will be noted, apply in some degree to organizations
ranging in size from very large to very small
i
1* The systems in many concerns have been established over long
periods of timo as required by the various supervisors,
department heads or top management* LU;ny of these systems
were probably very good at one time} some were not good
oven when adopted ,
2* Some of the apparently good systems were built around the
special abilities and personalities of the persons in the
organization* Systems designed to accomodate one particu-
lar set of abilities which are no longer present in the
organization do not operate well*
3* Many originally good systems have become bad ones because
.
the character of the business operations has changed
without corresponding adjustments in the systems* Outmoded
systems remain in effect, but with deteriorated value*
4* An activity is sometimes assigned to a department because
of its physical location, or for some other convenient but
organizationally illogical reason*
5* As a company grows and new functions are added, it is
necessary to redesign old systems and to develop carefully
07
For an example of the role of the Navy LUnugoment Office
in assisting in the battle against paperwork see "CINCNEI2! Reviews




perfected new ones to hanule the added activities. Other-
vise, the "layoring effect" takes place, and the net effect
of all tho added systems—each one good when considered by
itsoIf—will be poor coordination, and wasted effort*
0* In many cases ays teas are started as stopgap meaouros, but
instead of being dispensed with when no longer needed thoy
achieve a status of permanence*
7* Poor systems accumulate beoause people tend to cling to
those things to which they are accustomed. Meanwhile, the
technology of the age is rendering older systems obsolete at
an increasing rate*
8* Since there is at present no system for inspecting or evalu-
ating systems in tho operating forces, or most of the rest
of tho Navy, many unacceptable systems have not been posi—
28
tively identified, improved or eliminated*
Although organizations in general aro vulnerable to encroach-
ment by poor systems, there are many very efficient systems in
operation in tho Navy today* Two excellent examples of highly
detailed systems which operate well without imposing burdens on the
command structure are:
1* The Enlisted Distribution System which has revolutionized
porsonnel planning and assignment procedures, placed sea-
shore rotation on an equitable basis and offers to shape
enlisted careers into predictable, realistic patterns*
This has been accompanied with a reduction of effort formerly
devoted by units to manpower planning, and by an increase in
the personal consideration that can be given to each trans-
feree*
"The first seven ef the reasons listed above are based on
Barisb, op * cit * t p* 6*
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2* The BuWcpa system for reporting defective aviation material,
which tics quality control to fleet material usage, By
means of sinply prepared roporte, information on failed
aviation oquipment la promptly brought to the attention of
quality control organizational This systom ia doaigiaod to
oncourage preparation of the reports at the lowest levol of
the operating unit which can combine knowledge of facts and
couple- toucan of preparation* A typical report is prepared
in pencil by a junior petty officer, reviewed by a CPO,
forwarded to the Aviation Safety Center where it ia ev^lu.-tcd
and, possibly, aent on to the manufacturer of the failed
material* Important failaros, of course, uro given addi-
tional attention by tho chain—of—command*
It will be noted that theso two systems involve}
1* A flow of information* Doth systems handle a great deal of
information, but a minimum of effort is required for its
preparation*
2* The integration of functional authority* The information
flows directly to the elements concerned, the chain-of-comuand
is not directly concerned*
3* The characteristic of control* Over individuals in the one
case, failure data in the other*
4* The factor of complexity* Both are relatively si, pic at the
lower levels and become increasingly complex as the informa-
tion becomes centralized*
5* A contribution toward the effectiveness of the Navy* The two
Gystems add greatly to tho ability of the Navy to reach its
objectives*
Using the two sample cases as guides, what other systoms might
lend themselves to examination? There uro hundreds of systems in
operation in any large-scale organization, • c.i dozens in even the
smallest Navy organizations* The systems described below illustrates
(a) the types of systems which can oasily be brought under examination
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with promiso of meeting objectiveo at reduced cost, und (b) tho
point at which responsibility for instituting this roview lies in
each case*
Case Examples *
1. A ship's personnel officer institutes a check-in/chock-out
system for persons reporting aboard or departing. By
eliminating noa-esseatial entries ~nd arranging the remain-
ing card entrios ia a logicul order, he can minimize the
time required for chock-in/check-out. Following the princi-
ple of management by exception, he Cc.a limit the number of
required c.rd entries. For example, persons who ct^n state
that they have no dealings in progress with tho library
need not be required to call at the library, Signatures
need not be roquirod where check-ia/check-out con be accom-
plished by telephone, etc.
Ucspossibility . The porson instituting the system is
responsible for determining that it will operate with
maximum efficiency, and for reviewing it periodically,
2. A Fleet Coiaaaador requiro3 specified information at periodic
intervals. By examining the preferred techniques for assem-
bling the nocessary information and the most denirable
methods for collecting the information (typed roports,
reviewed by all authorities on the ekai*-of-command, versus,
perhaps, check-the-box pos*c<»rds prepared by individuals
concerned) he assures that minimum effort will be absorbed
by the system consistent with the command emphasis to be
given the system.
Responsibility . Same as Example 1.
3. A Bureau analyses its m.-nu -Is and directives and finds that
several of its instructions deal with the s.nao matter. By
combining the directives into simplified form, the work re-
quired to comply with tho directives is reduced. This tech-
nique was used by BuPers in combining soae sixty Instructions
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and Notices into one document • The result was substantial
improvement in the performance of units operating under the
prescribed system*
Responsibility * Sane as Example 1*
4* A Destroyer Flotilla Conmandor observes that the ships of
one division frequently require a shorter timo to rig for
fueling (paint their hul^s or respond to correspondencO| etc*)
than do E03t other ships of his flotilla. By analyzing the
systems utilized by the fast-acting division ho is able to
publicize the preferred mothod to the other units, thus
raising the effectiveness of the entire force.
Responsibility * Tho Flotilla Commander has tho responsibility
for analyzing and introducing improved methods* Ilowovor, once
the improved methods become known to the flotilla, tho Command-
ing Officers thon assume tho responsibility* Until then, the
responsibility remains at the lowest level that is aware of
tho problem, the Flotilla Commander*
5* A roi establishes a divisional logs and records system* The
petty officer should assure himself that a minimum of effort
is absorbed in recording essontial information and that non-
essential information is omitted* If the record is oxpected
to contain repetitious entries, he should consider using a
stamp, an embossing technique or a chock—list* no should
eliminate the rocord as soon as it ha3 served its purpose*
Responsibility * Tho authority vho established tho aew system,
tho P01.
6* A Work Study Team determines in conjunction with a carrier
administrative office that a training effort requiring x
instruction hours and y student hours produced ^ results in
the following programs* (a) advancement—ia-ruto training
program, (b) safe driving program, (c) moral leadership pro-
grrja, (d) shipboard orientation program, etc* By increasing
or decreasing the training effort, optimum results can be
ostimated for similar programs*
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responsibility * Tho head of tho V/orfc Study learn ia obligated
to inform all authorities who will bo iavolvod in aimilar
programs* Ho should recommend that further efforts in thoco
aroaa take the xyz formula into account and feed back addi-
tional information for further distribution. Once provided
with the information, lino authority acsuuos the responsi-
bility for instituting such systems as aro appropriate to
29
tho units concerned*
This roviow of so looted systems hua examined the problem of
fixing responsibility for efficient systems* Ai a roault of this
brief review, it can bo tentatively suggc3tod that responsibility
for efficiency of a syatoa (and the elimination of an ineffective
system) lies with one of the following authorities: (a) tho authority
who institutes tho systom, (b) a higher authority who recognizes the
need for an improved system, or (c) a staff authority, which recog-
nizes tho nood for an improved system* This staff authority is
eventually rclioved of responsibility by the cognizant line authority
(a) or (b) above*
As a final observation, it appears that it will be difficult
to show that moat systems now in use by the operating forces of tho
Navy are more efficient than similar systems in civilian organizations*
It is common experience in industrial applications to find that very
substantial improvements in efficiency—the return of uaeful output
29
For an opposing view which holds that no staff authority
has responsibility for introducing improved systems, see Philip II.
Thurston, Systems and Procedures Respon s ib i 1 i ty (Bostons Soldiers
Field, harvard University, lyo9), p* HG et, sogg * This limited view
of responsibility is not shared by professional mani-goment analysts
who of t-en assume the burden of responsibility for improving systems
until relieved of it by line ..uthority* Until line authority has
an awareness of both the problem and the solution, however, systems
specialists must retain the responsibility for Attempting to install
tho most efficient systems possible* Only rejection of the proposed




for given useful input —aro brought, about by analysis and adjust-
nent of systens. If Navy organizations cannot claiu lovola of
efficiency comparable to those of industry, tho implication is that
the wor?i habit3 and work syatcno of tho Navy desorve analytical
attention*
30




I* Work simplification and systems analysis aro techniques
widely used by industry and to a lesser extent by the shore
establishment. The results of these practices have been
important savings in manpower ,.nd money, or greatly increased
output without on increase in input*
II* The operating forces h-ve begun to install a formal work
simplification (work study) program, and have not yet in-
stituted a systematic systems analysis program*
III* Tho Work Study program presently contemplated is a modest-
scale effort which may bo expected to repay its costs many
times over*
IV* The Work Study Program appears to be specif i cully designed
to avoid the stresses and conflicts which frequently occur
when aggressive work simplification programs ure instituted,
V* Finding the best compromise between maximum implementation
of improved procedures and minimum adverse reaction by
affected organizations will require a high level of adroit-
ness on the part of tho work study authorities*
VI* The prime lesson learned from the experience of industry and
the shore establishment is that administration of a program
of this nature by a centralized authority leads to emphasis
on the interchangeability of procedures. However, central
authorities arc rarely in a position to insist on the adop-




VII. TLo systems Analysis concopt, which broadly embraces all
methods for accomplishing an organization's objective iu an
efficiont manner has been applied only to a very limited
extent by the operating forces. Even xaoro than work sim-
plification, systems analysis promises very substantial
increases in the ability to reach organizational objectives
without increased consumption of resources*
VIII* The primary problem in applying systems analysis involves
placing responsibility for the efficiency of the system*
Since systems integrate functional authority, traditional
patterns of responsibility may not sufficiently encompass
all the systems which apply to a given organization* A
preliminary evaluation of several sample systems suggests
that responsibility for efficient systems lies with one of
throe authoritiost
1* Tbo authority who institutes the system,
2* A higher authority who recognizes the need for an
improved system, or





It is recor-aaendod thati
I* The Fleet Work Study Program proceed at the maximum practical
rate* •
II* The Fleet Work Study Group adopt dynamic rather than permis-
sive methods of selecting subjects for study*
III* Is publishing its findings, the Fleet Work Study Group con-
tinue the veil-chosen policy of not insisting on fleet-vide
adoption of centrally-selected methods* A fine balance must
be established between centralized study and decentralized
implementation*
IV* The Fleet Work Study Group expand its efforts to include con-
siderably more than developing simplified working procedures*
This expansion of effort should emphasize analysis of tho
systems utilized in meeting Navy objectives, with a view
toward achieving the objectives with a reduction of assigned
resources*
V* In work study training programs, the responsibility of both
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